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As of the mid-eighties, a group of women philosophers, 
mostly from the Northern Italian city of Verona, rigorously 
emerge from the Italian feminist cultural landscape. They call 
themselves "Diotima," quite consciously fill their rank and file 
with more than just academic women, center their arguments pri-
marily on the concepts of "sexual difference," of feminine episte-
mologies and ethics leading to absolute feminine freedom, 
privilege encounters with the classical philosophical texts of the 
Western tradition, formulate the contours of a social-symbolic 
politics, of a feminist political practice designed to realize forms 
of freedom for women, and seem to, depending on one's point of 
view, either loosely align themselves with, or function exclusively 
as the elite think tank of the Libreria delle donne di Milano, one of 
the many public and controversial women's centers that have 
established themselves since the beginnings of second-wave femi-
nism in Italy .1 "Diotima's" gesture of distinctly naming itself, 
focusing on a set of foundational concepts, privileging Western 
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philosophy as an object of knowledge, demanding a political 
strategy, constituting itself as a democratic collective and aligning 
itself with a feminist center-in this case a quite powerful and 
influential one-perhaps even functioning as the theoretical, if 
embattled, avant-garde of a largely socially differentiated 
women's movement in the Italian North-all of these things seem 
to be nothing new to those initiated in one way or another to the 
trajectory of second-wave feminism in Italy. By evoking the term 
"the trajectory of Italian second-wave feminism" I do not mean to 
suggest that there exists simply one form of Italian feminism, or 
that there is simply one way of reading that social and cultural 
text. 2 Recorded and unrecorded histories of Italian second-wave 
feminism alike, as they have positioned themselves in the public 
sphere over the last decade and a half, and as they continue to 
flourish on private grounds, surely attest to the many ways of 
reading the vicissitudes, the victories, and the defeats of Italian 
second-wave feminism. And there are multiple ways in which 
feminism, as a movement, in its victories and defeats, has affected 
the structure of women's life-world, women's interaction with 
each other, and women's interaction with the symbolic and not-
so-symbolic state and cultural apparatuses. Yet the multiplicity of 
heterogeneous experiential designs, often evoked, in particular, in 
the context of Italian feminism, is also marked by a set of rather 
simple and straightforward events, which were neither simply 
nor straightforwardly accomplished, but which potentially guar-
antee more freedom for many women: the right to divorce, abor-
tion rights, the new family law, and the current struggles for the 
Law on Sexual Violence.3 Between the heterogeneities of feminist 
experiences, positions, and politics and the actual political gains 
of Italian women, there are the contours of a trajectory of a femi-
nist movement which, no matter how we tell its story, seems to 
bespeak a cultural specificity of its own. "Diotima," with its 
predilection for a couple of foundational concepts, such as "sexu-
al difference" and, by implication, "the generation of absolute 
freedom," its privileging of Western philosophy as an object of 
knowledge in a feminist discourse, its focusing on non-Italian 
philosophers-on Descartes, Hegel, and Freud-when engaging 
with the classical philosophical canon, yet also with its insistence 
on a political agenda that cannot do and refuses to do without 
agency and, thus, civic responsibility and communicative ethics 
is, so I would argue, telling of the ways in which Italian feminism 
has tended to do business for a while, and telling of the ways in 
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which Italian feminism, in spite of its heterogeneous nature, dif-
fers from the major feminist contours of other cultures in the 
West. 
By referring to the apparently rather stable cultural and rep-
resentational business practices of Italian feminism, I do not mean 
to suggest that Italian feminism displays a timeless, universal 
specificity, impervious to the general trends in Italian culture and 
society at large which are, as one might expect, not unrelated to 
trends in Western culture in general. Indeed, the history of Italian 
feminism is, as most feminisms in the West, tied to the general 
adventures of its culture, its politics, its economics, and most 
accounts acknowledge that much. Italian feminism emerges by 
the late sixties-next to the student movement and the enormous 
social and political gains of the working class unions-and for-
mulates its desires with a theoretical apparatus deeply indebted 
to the neo-Marxist canon and the Frankfurt School. The first femi-
nist groups, such as Gruppo Demau, standing for "Demystifica-
tion of Authoritarianism" or Rivolta Femminile, "Feminine 
Revolt," reflect, by the very choice of their names, some of the 
privileged vocabularies of the period. Italian women made, next 
to the political and economic advances of the working class, enor-
mous political and cultural gains by the early seventies, manifest-
ing itself in cultural enterprises such as publications, publishing 
houses, radio stations, and spaces expressly set up for women. 
Simultaneously, and precisely because of the general politicization 
of the public sphere, Italian feminists were caught, at the begin-
ning and the middle of the seventies, between their commitment 
to left politics on the one hand, and their commitment to feminist 
politics and culture on the other hand. This struggle, which has 
sometimes been identified by the term "double militancy," was 
somewhat exhausted by the later seventies. This is, of course, 
also roughly the moment in which the left in Italy, after enormous 
political and social gains, reflected in the dynamic culture of the 
early to mid-seventies, retreats, or is forced to retreat, depending 
on one's analytical preferences. This is the moment in which, as I 
like to state it, "Nietzsche replaces Marx, body replaces class, and 
the genealogy the dialectic." As, under the banner of a "crisis of 
reason," Italy of the late seventies bans from its general realm of 
cultural experiences and desires collective endeavors from its sub-
jectivist horizon of expectations, thereby renewing philosophical 
vocabularies of existentialist provenance, Italian feminism, in this 
historical account, both similarly retreats into privacy and some-
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times perhaps even into silence, while simultaneously maintain-
ing, however, a minimum of practical philosophy. That is to say, 
while the cultural workers of "soft philosophies" -as Italy steadi-
ly advances to a position as one of the major Western technologi-
cal and economic powers- minimize the possibilities of a 
political project, appositively critiquing the realm of human agen-
cy and responsibility, and downplaying their privileged status in 
their society and in their world, many Italian feminists insist on 
maximizing the possibilities of a political project, on human agen-
cy, and on playing up their underprivileged status in their soci-
ety. Surely, this kind of politics does not primarily focus on 
public institutions, on the educational system, on cultural estab-
lishments, on the family, as earlier feminists defined the terrain of 
their political activism. Rather, this kind of politics focuses on 
human interaction, more precisely, on the interaction between 
women and the social-symbolic potential of that relationship, on a 
feminist ethics. 
Italian feminism clearly does not generate itself outside its 
cultures. What is not so clear is which cultural track of the many 
tracks it is on. As part of the Western hegemonic culture, Italy, 
including its feminism, has not escaped, does not escape, nor does 
it have any reason or desire to escape the effects of the extraordi-
narily powerful hegemonic cultural stock exchange, which, as of 
late, efficaciously (rationally, that is) trades traditional or so-called 
modern regimes of truth with new or so-called post-modern ratio-
nalities. The logistics of this late-twentieth-century version of a 
"querelles des anciens et des modernes," in no way inferior, with 
its at times conceptually self-righteous dogmatism, illiterate 
reductivism, political opportunism, and corporate orthodoxy, to 
earlier contests of the sort in the seventeenth or the thirteenth cen-
tury, are by now known to most shareholders of the critical busi-
ness on both sides of the exchange. There is no reason to 
reproduce some of it here. Let it suffice by saying that Italy, with 
the Taylorized productions and skillful overseas marketing of, 
among other things, the "pensiero debole" of Vattimo & Co., not 
only holds (and why should it not?) as one of the major economic 
powers of the Western hemisphere, its profitable accounts in the 
post-modern cultural corporations of late capitalism. Italy also, 
and for me more importantly, accrues extraordinary profits by the 
very activities and political program of "Diotima" in the cultural 
and social capital of Western feminism. Whether these profits are 
indeed re-investable in some form or another on our own cultural 
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grounds here in the U. S.-given the difficulties, the displace-
ments, and the reductionisms that often inform the import and 
export of cultural commodities-is one of the questions I will 
briefly address as I conclude this brief discussion of the politics of 
"Diotima." 4 More immediate is the question as to what "Diotima" 
does and what it wants. The way in which "Diotima" does busi-
ness, the language it uses when writing its programs, stating its 
positions, and seeking alliances, what it conceptually, epistemo-
logically, and ethically promotes and what it refuses to promote, 
the goals it sets for itself and the politics it pursues, indicate to 
me, however, that what appears to be a universal squabble 
between "modern-speak" or "post-modern-speak" is, in the con-
text of "Diotima," at best of secondary importance, and at worst 
of no relevance at all. While "Diotima" surely emerges in an era 
that knows of the contest of the modern with the post-modern, 
while it adopts many a scheme from one of the major and, to me, 
most attractive goddesses of the Western post-modern pan-
theon-I am referring to Luce Irigaray-its political message 
knows of the non-divine, the human context within which it aris-
es: the boundaries and the possibilities of Italian cultural, educa-
tional, economic, legal, and social apparatuses, that constitute the 
material, symbolic, and imaginary structure of the life-world of 
many women.s I doubt that "Diotima" was interested in evoking 
Marx's famous preface to the "Contribution to a Critique of Politi-
cal Economy " when it notes that it is not theory that makes or 
determines life, but life-in this case cultural life-that makes theory. 
With or without Marx, those Italian feminist theorists who, 
reflecting on their own history over the last few decades and a 
half, reproduce the origins or the genealogy of the theory and 
practice of sexual difference and of the path that leads to freedom 
as theoretically stated and promoted by "Diotima," rigorously 
view their theories as a result of their experiences in everyday life, 
rather than the other way around (as a cause, that is). Laws of 
causation are distinctly observed in this rigorously linear narra-
tive. Indeed, in a collective publication of the Libreria delle donne 
di Milano, the Women's Bookstore of Milan, entitled Non credere 
di avere dei diritti and subtitled La generazione della liberta femminile 
nell'idea e nelle vicende di un gruppo di donne, which rehearses the 
history of Italian feminism from its fabulous beginnings in the late 
sixties to recent developments, no less fabulous, in the middle of 
the eighties, the problematic of the dialectical relation of theory to 
praxis, long the Achilles heel of all kinds of critical theories, expe-
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riences here something of a rigorous re-formulation. 6 Whether it 
adds to or detracts from the powers of critical theory in the long 
run is not to the point. What is to the point and what matters in 
the story of the Women's movement in Italy, as presented and 
emphasized by the Women's Bookstore of Milan, are first and 
foremost not the readings of feminist texts, the authorities of lead-
ing feminists, or the appropriation of theoretical apparatuses, but 
the experiences of everyday life of Italian feminists of all walks of 
life. The Women's Bookstore Collective substantiates this propo-
sition of matter over idea, of material, collective experience over 
individual contemplation, of the primacy of praxis over theory, by 
non-negotiably ousting references to individual theorists or theo-
retical apparatuses from the text, by insisting on collective bodies 
rather than individual ones, by subscribing to knowledges that 
are gathered on public rather than private grounds, and by adopt-
ing a language and a rhetoric of everyday life conspicuously 
devoid, so it seems to an outsider, of those algebraic linguisticali-
ties known to many as "post-modern-speak." However, while 
complex linguistic choices surely can redress the complexity of a 
message, it does not have to do so. And conversely, simplicity in 
language is no guarantee for simplicity in or of thought. I do not 
think that I have to substantiate my assertion here. The linguistic 
choices of the Women's Bookstore Collective are made in favor of 
simplicity. The conceptual choices, and the modalities of their 
logic, are not. The story of Italian feminism told by the Collective 
is a fascinating performance of a feminist drama, where Italian 
women have inexorably moved from non-freedom to freedom in 
something like a superbly structured three-act play: unimpaired 
by sophisticated theoretical structures, by ideal or subjectivist 
interventions, or simply by historical accidents, Italian women 
have, on the basis of their very experiences in the micrological 
structures of everyday life, recognized that there is a non-freedom 
implied by simply "being-in-themselves-in-sexually-undifferenti-
a ted-fashion." This "being-in-themsel ves-in-sexuall y-undiff eren-
tia ted -fashion," this non-freedom or stage one of the feminist 
historical drama, has been overcome and mediated onto a higher 
and more advanced stage of "being-for-themselves-in-sexually-
differentiated-fashion" in that a second stage has antithetically 
opposed the originary stage by "being-for-the-other/ s-in-differ-
ence." Or to put it more directly: stage one of "being in itself" (an 
sich sein), without a recognition of sexual difference, has been 
opposed by a stage two of "being-for-the-other" in sexual, social, 
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cultural, and symbolic difference, which alone can realize the 
potentially authentic freedom of "being-for-itself" (fuer sich sein) 
in sexual difference. Does this sound like a feminist scenario of 
Hegel's master-slave dialectic? It surely does. And indeed, as in 
Hegel's rigorous three-stage drama of the absolute spirit, the sub-
ject of the linear trajectory from inauthenticity to freedom of the 
Italian feminist phenomenology, Italian women that is, had, from 
the very beginning, so in the account of the Women's Bookstore 
Collective, no choice but to follow the inexorable necessity of their 
dialectical history. For from the days of the first collectives of Ital-
ian feminism, the Gruppo Demau of 1967, or of Rivolta Fem-
minile in the early seventies, to the events of the mid-seventies, to 
the rise of the myriad of consciousness-raising groups, and alter-
native practices of the unconscious, and from the many public 
debates on abortion law and the Law on Sexual Violence to inci-
sive meetings in Pinarella or Paestum, and to the discovery of 
models of feminine freedom in the reading of women's literature, 
a significant tangent of the Italian women's movement, in particu-
lar of the autonomous women's movement, so we are told in indi-
rect terms, was materially driven towards the absolute knowledge 
of essentialist freedom embedded in the social-symbolic practices 
of sexual difference . By historical necessity, that social-symbolic 
practice of sexual difference alone is capable of overcoming the 
non-essentialism of emancipatory, egalitarian, and liberatory 
rhetorics which has kept the spirit of the Italian women's move-
ment unfree in its non-acknowledgment of sexual difference. 
Surely I am somewhat overstating the point. Hegel's shad-
ows are not as transparent in the linear narrative of the Women's 
Bookstore Collective of Milan as I make them out to be. The Col-
lective emphasizes, more than once, that it is merely one of many 
stories that is being told, the story of a particular feminist group 
among many feminist groups that make up Italian feminism. And 
one can profitably read it as such. Yet there is more than one rea-
son why I think that discrepancies between intentionality and 
performance outweigh expressly stated harmonies. For one, the 
story told by the Collective is not simply an Italian story, in that 
the need to address relations among women rather than simply 
being with women has also been part of our experiences outside 
of Italy. I have discussed some of these historical similarities else-
where.7 And two, and for my purposes here more importantly, 
the dialectization of the story of the Italian women's movement, 
as it appears on the expressly untheoretical pages of the Collec-
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tive, is brought into sharp focus in the highly theoretical forms of 
knowledge put forth in the various publications of "Diotima." I 
will only address the latter point. 
"Diotima's" invention is a feminist theoretical model based 
on a specific understanding of sexual difference, namely of its 
affirmation. It promises individual and social freedom for all 
women. This model, mostly based on Luce Irigaray's notion of an 
ethics of sexual difference, is both epistemological and ethical, as 
well as ontological. Its central questions are these: How can 
woman become a subject? How is it possible that she love herself, 
if indeed her effective situation is to be in exile, is to be to love the 
man, the children, the house? How can women be a subject if the 
symbolic, the linguistic, the conceptual within which she moves is 
not of her own making? How can she be a subject if she is the 
negated other of the theory of the subject of Western phallocratic 
discourse? How can she be a subject if she fuses with her origins, 
the mother, who too is excluded from the symbolic, rather than 
positively relating to her origins in difference? The notion of Sub-
ject is conceived, as in Hegel's notion of "ethicality" or "Sit -
tlichkeit," both as an individual and a social category. Yet 
"Diotima' s" ethics of sexual difference is also a corrective to 
Hegel's notion of ethicality. In Hegel's understanding of the sub-
ject, men represent the universal individual in that they, devoid of 
natural determinacy, create the world of human law and human 
community. Women, as generators of life, as the embodiment of 
family and thus of religious community, represent the particular 
individual and divine law. As wives and thus part of the institu-
tion of the family, women guarantee, without being it, universal 
individuality or the subject. They take part in it, but only indi-
rectly. So woman/wife represents divine law, while simultaneous-
ly being neither free nor a subject. She can be a subject, as sister 
to a brother, as Antigone was to Polynices. In this narrative taken 
from Hegel's Phenomenology, which "Diotima" narrates on the 
basis of Irigaray, woman loses not once but twice when it comes 
to her subjecthood. Not only can she not be a subject when she 
realizes what she ought to realize, the representation of divine 
law qua generator of life (as wife of a citizen who is part of a 
human community), she can also not be a subject when she 
departs from the human community (when she refuses to be a 
wife and a production machine for children). "Diotima" trans-
forms this double loss into a feminist advantage. Woman can 
become a subject by retrieving the originary mother, not by fusing 
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or merging with her origins, her originary mother, but rather by 
establishing a distance, a distinctly differentiated relation to and 
with the mother, indeed a hierarchical relation, perhaps a relation 
of power. This retrieving of the originary mother is both actual 
and symbolic. It is actual by inactivating the originary relation of 
mother to daughter , an unequal relation given the original ph ysi-
cal, psychic, and emotional advantage the mother has over the 
daughter; it is symbolic in that this inactivating takes place in 
relations with and to other women. The non-fusion with the ori -
gins thus takes place on two axes, in both instances emphasizing 
differences among women, the inactivating of which generates 
the possibilities of subjecthood and thus freedom. s In this sense 
Hegel's notion of woman/mother/wife as non-subject and repre-
sentation of divine law turns into woman/mother as generators 
of human law. The ethics of sexual difference, consciously inacti-
vating mother/ daughter and daughter/ mother relations among 
women as eternal replay of the originary mother/ daughter rela-
tion, generates a new sociality, a new symbolics, a new language, 
a new human community. It changes the status of women from a 
sex that is not one into a sex that is one. 
"Diotima" has been attacked on various occasions for not 
addressing the lesbian question in its discussion of its ethics of 
sexual difference. 9 And its rank and file, the Women's Bookstore 
of Milan, has been attacked for not supporting the struggle for 
changing the Law on Sexual Violence. 10 I think that my narrative 
of "Diotima's" theoretical model is ample explanation as to why it 
neither theoretically promotes a discourse on lesbian sexuality nor 
actively participates in reform politics. "Diotima" has ambitious, 
perhaps utopian, conceptual and political plans, with priorities 
and agendas that resist the changing fashions of fashionable dis-
course. Their experiences in women's groups, in the movement, 
and above all their work in collectives, which they deliberately 
reproduce, after years of silence, at a historical moment that cele-
brates rampant individualism, the poverty of feminism, and the 
counter-revolution to the woman's cause-the unsurpassed femi-
nist experience of solidarity of the seventies which they attempt to 
reproduce, in the eighties, against historical odds, provides them 
with conceptual incisiveness and moral strength that is not easily 
bullied into facile solutions or directions . Adriana Cavarero's 
prose, as apparent from her "Per una teoria della differenza ses-
suale," is, in spite of its complex theoretical agenda and its indebt-
edness to French "parler theorie," a rare example of serious 
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feminist writing in the eighties in the West.11 Her style is clear, she 
is non-pretentious, and unencumbered by the apoliticality of her 
time. While many of her contemporaries, men and women alike, 
mumble something of the events or the effects of the "Red 
Brigades" in order to legitimate their abandoning of the market-
place; their reshuffling of antiquated notions of memories and the 
past, and their early retirement to the privacies of privilege, 
Cavarero's work in particular and the "Diotima" project in gener-
al, pursue a courageous if, perhaps, unpopular vision of collectivi-
ty and sociality. 
So in spite of the rigorous philosophical and conceptual 
frame inactivated by the responses to the question of how a 
woman can become a subject, which would suggest primarily an 
ontological program, there is, then, an equally rigorous ethical, 
and thus ultimately political, program. In a sense, the work of 
"Diotima" doubles the work of the Women's Bookstore Collec-
tive. Whereas the latter presents itself expressly in a simple his-
torical narrative while revealing a complex conceptual 
framework, the former presents itself in complex conceptual nar-
rative while revealing a simple political framework. In both the 
theory and the practice of the Women's Bookstore Collective and 
"Diotima," woman becomes a subject by being with other women 
in a specific way, according to the rules of a specific feminine-
made ethicality. That ethicality has a name: it is called the prac-
tice of the "affidamento," the practice of one woman entrusting 
herself to another woman, a woman different in status and value, 
one that commands a surplus in authority and power, in knowl-
edge and experience, a surplus which she symbolically transfers 
to the less authoritative and less powerful woman, thereby medi-
ating between the outside (male symbolic) world and the woman. 
It is this mediation between the symbolic mother and the daugh-
ter that woman can become who she has always potentially been 
but never was: a free, authentic subject. For us, on this side of the 
ocean, "Diotima' s" practical suggestion as to how to be with 
women, as to how to become a subject on the basis of the practice 
of the "affidamento," where one woman acknowledges the "more" 
or the "surplus" in another woman, where, paradoxically, hierar-
chy produces equality by effacing equality in the first place, might 
appear somewhat problematical, and so might "Diotima's" theo-
retical proposition, that woman can become a subject of her own. 
We do live, after all, at a moment in which the unity and identity 
of the subject are rigorously called into question by psycholin-
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guistically inspired orientations, and in which the contests 
between Freud and Lacan, even between the early Lacan and the 
later Lacan, when it comes to the powers and the limits of the 
operations of the unconscious, have not been satisfactorily 
resolved. 12 There is much to be said for both a rigorous critique of 
"Diotima's" politics of the subject on the one hand, and its subject 
of politics on the other. 13 I will engage in neither here: not because 
I do not want to address the hierarchical structure, which, inex-
orably lurking from the theoretical construction of the "affidamen-
to," is probably not universally applicable, but perhaps and rather 
more applicable in some social spheres than in others, in social sit-
uations in which there is something of a natural mother/ daughter 
relation to begin with. 14 Moreover, and conversely, and even in 
situations that lend themselves naturally to mother/ daughter 
relations among women, such as in educational structures, the 
practice of the "affidamento," depending in large part on the origi-
nary mother/ daughter relation, is perhaps not much of a need or 
desire for those women whose originary relation with the mother 
was mostly one of equity rather than hierarchy, of friendship, of 
solidarity, and community rather than of authority and submis-
sion, one of sisterhood, acceptance, tolerance, and immense joy of 
being, of laughing, of celebrating rather than one of tension, ambi-
guities, possessiveness, intolerance, and envy. If I do not want to 
address the problematic nature of the practice of sexual difference 
or the "affidamento" here then it is not due to a lack of critical 
desire. Rather, I find it more interesting to present the position of 
"Diotima" to a community which could profit from the way in 
which it addresses the notion of differential power. I would wel-
come a discussion of power relations among women which 
would not displace the issue by pitting theoretical systems against 
each other, by deploying differences in critical preference as the 
grounds on which to discuss unequal relations. The structure of 
our life-world as women does not exhaust itself in theory, and 
mature theorists welcome and depend, on the coexistence of 
divergent theories. What we could do with today is not the dis-
placement of the issue of power relations and their effects in the 
realm of theory, but rather an open discussion of the ways in 
which unequal relations of power among women do, as we here 
in the U .S. experience an immense poverty of feminism, effect the 
lives of many women sometimes in ways that cynically deride the 
basic forms of feminist solidarity. "Diotima" can help us to raise 
some questions in order to get this long overdue debate going. 
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Serna/ Difference: A Theory of Social-Symbolic Practice (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 
1990). The Italian text was published by Rosenberg & Sellier, Turin, 1987. It will 
be reviewed in Differentia 6. 
7. See Renate Holub, "For the Record: The Non-Language of Italian Femi-
nist Philosophy," Romance Language Annual 1 (1990) 133-40. 
8. See Franca Bimbi, Laura Grasso, Maria Zancan, Gruppo di filosofia 
Diotima. II Filo di Arianna. Letture della differenza sessuale (Rome: Cooperativa 
Utopia, 1987), pp. 71-129. 
9. See Teresa de Lauretis, "The Essence of the Triangle or Taking the Risk 
of Essentialism Seriously: Feminist Theory in Italy, the U.S., and Britain," Differ-
ences 1 (1989) 3-38, as well as her introduction to Sexual Difference: A Theon; of 
Social-Symbolic Practice, op. cit., pp. 1-21, in particular her response to Luisa 
Muraro's letter, p. 18. 
10. See Elisabetta Addis, "Women's Liberation and the Law on Sexual Vio-
lence: The Italian Feminist Debate," Socialist Review 19 (1989) 4: 114-5. 
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11. Adriana Cavarero, "Per una teoria della differenza sessuale," in Adri-
ana Cavarero, Cristiana Fischer, Elvia Franco, Giannina Longobardi, Veronica 
Mariaux, Luisa Muraro, Anna Maria Piussi, Wanda Tommasi, Anita Sanvitto, 
Betty Zamarchi, Chiara Zamboni, Gloria Zanardo. Diotima: JI pensiero della dif-
ferenza sessuale (Milan: La Tartaruga, 1987), pp. 43-77. 
12. I am referring to the many debates in feminist circles which focus on 
the structure of the unconscious as the condition for feminine freedoms, or as its 
limits. See, in particular , the work of Jacqueline Rose and Juliett Mitchell, Femi-
11ine Sexuality. Jacques Laca11 and the eco/e freudie11ne (New York: Norton and Pan-
theon, 1985), who re-evaluate Lacan's early notion of the structure of the 
unconscious for a feminist agenda. Tori! Moi, in her Sex11al/Text11al Politics (Lon-
don and New York: 1985) states the various positions on this issue as they 
emerge from Helene Cixous, Luce lrigaray, and Julia Kristeva. See also the out-
standing essay by Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, "Sexual Linguistics: Gen-
der, Language, Sexuality," in Catherine Belsey and Jane Moore, eds., The Feminist 
Reader: Essays in Gender and the Politics of Literary Criticism (New York: Basic 
Blackwell, 1989), pp. 81-101; and Teresa Brennan, ed., Between Feminism and Psy-
choanalysis (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), pp. 89-139, with contribu-
tions by Rosi Braidotti, Margaret Whitford, and Luce lrigaray. See also Renate 
Holub "Between Plato and Quantum Theory: The Geometrics of Lacan's Quadri-
lateral Radicalism." Reviewing Shoshana Felman's Jacques Lacan and The Adven-
ture of lnsight, Jane Gallop's Reading Laca11, Juliett Flower MacCannell's "Figuring 
Lacan," and Ellie Ragland-Sullivan's "Jacques Lacan and the Philosophy of Psy-
choanalysis," in Textual Practise (I 991 ). 
13. A beautiful critique of "Diotima's" concept of subject and subjectivity 
has been proposed by Rosi Braidotti in La ricerca delle donne, eds. Maria Cristina 
Marcuzzo and Anna Rossi-Doria (Turin: Rosenberg & Seller, 1987), pp. 188-203. 
14. I am thinking, for instance , of schools and educational institutions, 
where a conscious mentoring of women students by women teachers is not an 
unwelcome and for that matter unusual practice. Indeed, many of the members 
of the "Diotima" collective work in education. 
